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he United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for
signature on December 10, 1982. Four months after the adoption of the
implementation agreement modifying its deep seabed mining provisions, the
Convention entered into force on November 16, 1994. The Convention has
rightly been called a constitution for the oceans, setting forth the system of
governance by and among States with respect to all activities in two-thirds
of the planet.
Law is a prescription for the future informed by the past. Our understanding of the impact of the Convention during the four decades that have
elapsed since its conclusion may be enhanced by considering what occurred
in the previous forty years.
In 1942 the world was at war. As World War II drew to a close, the
United States actively engaged with the rest of the world to strengthen the
global regime. To better protect the world from the scourge of war, the Charter of the United Nations was concluded in 1945, followed by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 designed to mitigate the horrors of armed conflict. To
better protect the Western democracies from renewed aggression, the North
Atlantic Treaty was concluded in 1949. Legal instruments such as the Chicago Convention of 1944 creating the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Bretton Woods agreements establishing the international financial system, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, extended that
engagement to international trade and communications, as did the 1948
treaty establishing what is now known as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). By the end of the decade of the 1940’s the U.N. General
Assembly had specifically created a mechanism for the codification and progressive development of international law as part of the larger project for
strengthening the fabric of peace. The law of the sea was one of its first
priorities.
There is little in these projects of global engagement that reflects the
Fortress America insular attitudes that can be discerned in the addresses and
some of the actions of President Roosevelt and other American leaders in
the late 1930’s, remnants no doubt of the American isolationism of the
1920’s.
There was also little to reflect such insular attitudes in the inherited international law of the sea as propounded and enjoyed by the United States
since its independence. The Grotian conception of the free high seas had
prevailed and with it the freedom of the seas enjoyed by every State for se-
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curity and for economic purposes. As new technologies emerged, that freedom was extended to self-powered ships, submarines, telecommunication
cables, and aircraft. Even in wartime, neutral States—notably including the
United States—insisted on respect for their exercise of these freedoms.
While there was an exception to the freedom of the seas, it was a very
limited one. Each coastal State was entitled to control the use of the sea
within one marine league—three nautical miles—of its coast. But even that
exception was subject to a right of innocent passage.
Needless to say there were some deviations, even by the United States.
It took an arbitral award in 1893 to tame ambitious claims with respect to
fur seals in the Bering Sea. During Prohibition the United States attempted
to prevent unlawful importation of alcohol well before the smugglers
reached the three-mile limit. A few foreign States made claims to territorial
seas or exclusive fishing zones beyond three miles from shore, ranging to
six, nine, or twelve miles. But there was remarkable stability in the international law of the sea compared with what was about to happen shortly after
the end of World War II.
On September 28, 1945, President Truman issued two proclamations.
The more famous of the two laid claim to the natural resources of the seabed
and subsoil of the broad continental shelf extending seaward of the threemile territorial sea of the United States.
This claim was not merely emulated. It triggered vast coastal State claims
to the waters of the high seas, beginning with the two-hundred-mile claims
of Chile and Peru in 1947. These inspired the Declaration of Santiago of
1952 by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, laying claim to exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction in a zona marítima embracing both the waters and the seabed and
subsoil extending from each of their coasts to a “minimum” distance of two
hundred nautical miles. These claims were gradually emulated by other Latin
American States and then spread to Africa and elsewhere. A number of the
claims were expressly identified as territorial sea claims.
The magnitude of the potential geographic effect of such claims is significant. Most or all of the waters within the world’s semi-enclosed gulfs and
seas are within two hundred nautical miles of some coast. This includes the
Caribbean Sea, the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the
Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. To their
dismay, Argentine security officials realized that Brazil’s two-hundred-mile
territorial sea claim measured from both its continental coast and its islands
extended far to the east, indeed not all that far from the limit of the twohundred-mile claims extending west from the African coast and islands.
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Other types of claims also proliferated. The judgment of the International Court of Justice upholding Norwegian straight baselines was followed
by ambitious baseline claims by others. Indonesia and the Philippines
claimed sovereignty over all the waters within their archipelagoes. Defending
Canada’s 1970 claim to control navigation within one hundred miles of its
Arctic coast, the leader of the Canadian delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, paraphrasing Shakespeare, quipped that he
came to bury Grotius, not to praise him.
Common law courts trying to understand a statute traditionally endeavored to identify the evil sought to be remedied. The most basic evil sought
to be remedied by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea was an epidemic of unilateralism inherent in the idea that to have the law that one
wishes all one need do is claim what one wishes and try to avoid judicial
review. Beginning with the vast coastal State claims made by the United
States and some of its Latin American neighbors in the wake of World War
II, over time the customary international law of the sea lost that quality of
law understood by every child: constraint. Instead, claim subsumed custom,
and customary international law became an enabler of a claim-what-you-like
unilateralism adorned in the raiment of lex ferenda.
Notwithstanding the existence of the four 1958 conventions on the law
of the sea that emerged from the work of the International Law Commission
and the first U.N. effort at global negotiation of the law of the sea, the claims
persisted and proliferated. Resistance might not have been futile, had it actually been possible to try it with some consistency.
—Vast coastal State claims over seabed resources met no resistance at
all. Instead, they were emulated and celebrated. “Instant customary law” was
the academy’s benediction.
—Vast coastal State claims over fisheries were decried by others as unlawful incursions on the high seas, but there was little effective resistance.
Economic sanctions for seizure of fishing vessels were waived under pressure from large companies with investments at potential risk in the country
carrying out the seizures. A French official once observed that at the cost of
stationing even a small British destroyer to protect British fishing in areas
claimed by Iceland, the price of cod would soon exceed that of smoked
salmon.
—Direct coastal State claims over navigation and overflight were not as
extensive in many areas, but the same process was evident. The classic position of a three-mile maximum limit of the territorial sea became a global
Maginot line; in practice claims of a twelve-mile territorial sea, and ambitious
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baseline claims, proliferated with some opposition but often without effective resistance. The result was that many straits were falling within the orbit
of coastal State sovereignty claims whose lawfulness was increasingly difficult to contest more than verbally.
—Physical resistance entailed risks of alienation, retribution, and escalation. The platform of principle upon which physical resistance might be
founded was itself eroding. Would every naval mission necessarily become
at least two: to dissuade attempts by a coastal State in one area to restrict
one’s access to another area where the ultimate object of the mission lay?
—There was no good alternative in some situations to relying on selfrestraint and voluntary compliance by foreign governments. How would one
protect thousands of miles of submarine telecommunication cables against
covert interference? How many people would board a commercial airliner
flying a dangerously contested route? What would it cost to insure a ship
conducting a contested survey?
Chest thumping about the ability of the United States and its allies—
anywhere and anytime—to enforce their view of their maritime freedoms
more often than not conjured an abstract world unencumbered by facts.
How precisely was one to roll back an explicit Brazilian claim of a two-hundred-mile territorial sea, which as such purported to eliminate freedom of
overflight and reduce freedom of navigation to the strictures of a suspendable right of innocent passage subject to unilateral coastal State regulation?
How precisely was one to deal with Indonesia’s sovereignty claim over the
waters within its vast archipelago without pushing the government into the
arms of one’s adversaries? Or the similar claim of a Philippine ally next door?
How precisely was one to enforce one’s freedom of navigation in the face of
a Canadian claim of a one-hundred-mile zone off its Arctic coast in which it
could unilaterally control navigation? What about the Alaskans who tell you
the Canadians may have a point?
Were there any doubt that the collapse of customary international law as
a real restraint on coastal State maritime claims had a direct impact on the
decision to seek a new global treaty on the law of the sea, one need go no
further than the source of the effort. The standard history is that the global
negotiation originated with a speech at the U.N. by the Maltese ambassador
about the future of the seabed beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction. That is only part of the story. At about the same time the world’s fastest
rising maritime power in the mid-1960’s—the U.S.S.R.—came to appreciate
the problems posed by proliferating coastal State claims. Notwithstanding
the ongoing Cold War, it approached the United States and some others
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directly about the possibility of a new global conference to fix the maximum
permissible breadth of the territorial sea at twelve miles. After months of
study, the United States responded affirmatively, emphasizing three basic
points: the need to secure widespread agreement lest a failure prompt even
more unilateral claims in derogation of high seas freedoms, the need to protect free transit of straits landward of twelve miles, and the need to accommodate coastal State interests in fishing beyond twelve miles. The decision
of the U.N. General Assembly to entrust a committee with substantive preparations for a new comprehensive conference on the law of the sea in effect
merged the two initiatives. The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea convened in New York in 1973, resumed in Caracas in 1974, and continued with two lengthy sessions per year in New York and Geneva, as well
as intensive intersessional negotiations, until completion of the Convention
in late 1982.
The Convention achieved in the ensuing four decades what customary
law was unable to provide in the previous forty years: the stability and predictability we expect from law. It is not the mere adoption of the text at the
concluding session of the conference that ensured this. It is the widespread
ratification.
The Convention now has 168 parties comprising an overwhelming majority of States from all regions and of all sizes and all degrees of material
wealth and military power. 1 The parties include States like Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Canada, Indonesia, and the Philippines, whose claims were mentioned above. Albeit with occasional interpretive strain, these States and virtually all of the other parties have generally brought their practice into conformity with the Convention. That is a signal achievement.
It is all the more remarkable if one considers that a fair number of the
few nonparties, including the United States, treat the Convention’s substantive provisions as declaratory of international law binding on all States. International courts and tribunals do so as well. This should not however blind
us to the importance of the goal of universal ratification.
1. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Agreement
relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UNITED NATIONS
(July 31, 2019), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/UNCLOS%20Status%20
table_ENG.pdf; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 1(2), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Five of the listed parties to the Convention are not among the current
193 U.N. members.
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A key element of the Convention’s contribution to stability of the law of
the sea is its dispute settlement system, in particular the provisions of Section
2 of Part XV on compulsory arbitration or adjudication of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. Those provisions
apply only to the parties to the Convention.
Compulsory jurisdiction was, and remains, far from the norm in international affairs, especially with respect to a treaty of the geographic and substantive scope of the Convention that has been so widely ratified. We might
recall that mandatory arbitration provisions were included in only one of the
four 1958 conventions on the law of the sea. And that one—on high seas
fishing—was the least widely ratified. Accordingly, it is possible, but by no
means assured or even likely, that a questionable maritime claim by a State
that is not party to the Law of the Sea Convention would be subject to review
by an international court or tribunal.
It is to be expected that scholars, in examining the effect of the Convention’s dispute settlement system, would concentrate on the disputes that
have arisen and the cases that have been decided. But a key issue in assessing
the overall effectiveness of a legal system is self-restraint and voluntary compliance. Lawyers routinely advise their clients on the consequences of a proposed course of action and the risks of litigation. There is good reason to
suppose that a similar process is at work within governments on questions
of the law of the sea where there is a risk of international litigation. That risk
accordingly helps to discourage claims of questionable legality in the first
place. Canada has conveniently provided us with some empirical data in this
regard: it twice excluded a new questionable maritime claim from its prior
purely optional acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute.
Stability in the law is not possible without adaptation to new circumstances. If one relies only on unilateral interpretation and application of the
Convention by individual governments to achieve the requisite adaptation,
then one risks reviving the problem of unilateralism that prompted the Convention’s negotiation in the first place. Accordingly, the Convention includes
its own mechanisms for adaptation as well. One notable example is the dispute settlement system, pursuant to which international courts and tribunals
evaluate competing views of the meaning and effect of the text in light of
the circumstances. Another is the continuing incorporation by reference of
generally accepted international regulations developed by the competent international organization on matters such as maritime safety and protection
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of the marine environment, including, in particular, the safety and environmental rules developed under the auspices of the IMO. Yet another is the
system of combined regulatory authority shared by the coastal State and the
competent international organization with respect to sea lanes and traffic
separation in straits and archipelagic waters. All of this appears to be working
much as contemplated.
That said, there is nevertheless cause for concern.
Serious environmentalists know that the Law of the Sea Convention remains the strongest comprehensive environmental treaty of its kind. That is
due in no small measure to the skill and persistence of their pioneering predecessors in linking environmental duties to the economic benefits and compulsory dispute settlement clauses of the Convention.
Yet some now seem to take the Convention for granted. It wasn’t even
mentioned in the U.N. Secretary-General’s statement for Ocean’s Day in
2022. And there are a few who, when they mention it at all, do so with the
demeanor of a child contemplating a bowl of spinach.
Compliance by the Convention’s parties has been reassuring but is hardly
perfect. China persists in claims to the South China Sea that are not consistent with its substantive or dispute settlement obligations as a party to the
Convention. And now some supporters of China’s claims aver that customary law supersedes the Convention. That would bring us full circle back to
precisely where we were before the Convention.
The argument nevertheless places a nonparty like the United States in an
awkward position. Insofar as its own rights and freedoms are concerned, the
U.S. platform of principle is itself necessarily founded on customary law.
This is lawfare with one hand tied behind one’s back.
Beginning with the Gulf of Maine case and continuing through the
Peru/Chile case, nonparties to the Convention have been careful before the
International Court of Justice to describe their claims in terms consistent
with the Convention. But now Colombia has broken with that pattern of
respect. Should that position be maintained and accepted by the Court with
respect to the detailed substantive provisions of Article 76, we risk erosion
in the compliance by other nonparties not only with the same provisions
establishing the precise limits of the continental shelf and the international
seabed “Area” beyond those limits, but with other provisions as well. That
in turn will put similar destabilizing pressure on some of the parties.
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This is but one example of a larger problem. Each of the coastal nonparties 2 is living with a time bomb waiting to destroy the general policy of respect for the Convention in the face of some domestic political pressure for
a unilateral claim. The largest of the nonparties—the United States—made
a unilateral claim in 1945 that triggered a process that threw all of the law of
the sea into disarray, ironically at the same time that the United States was
fashioning multilateral solutions to problems that doubtless were perceived
to be more profound and enduring. It took nearly four decades before a new
durable multilateral foundation for the law of the sea emerged. That should
be a lesson learned.
The most basic object of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
was to replace a system of conflicting unilateral claims of right with global
agreement on the rules of the law of the sea and the process for their implementation, interpretation, and application. That remains the Convention’s
most significant contribution to the rule of law in international affairs. Its
full realization demands nothing less than global ratification.

2. Coastal nonparties include Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Iran, Israel,
Libya, North Korea, Peru, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Venezuela. Landlocked nonparties include Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Liechtenstein, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
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